Month: December 2025

Japanese : https://i-rich.org/?p=2405

International Research Institute of Controversial Histries
Researcher Haruka Ikeda

On August 15, 1989, Eto Jun wrote a book titled Closed Narrative World: Censorship by the Occupation Forces and Postwar Japan (published by Bungei Shunju) and clearly explained how the postwar Japanese narrative world was restricted and distorted under the GHQ control and pointed out that the negative influence was still evident at the time of the publication.

Thirty-six years after the publication of his book, regrettably, the issue presented by Eto has not become a thing of the past.

To tell the truth, what Eto pointed out equally applies to the Nanjing Incident. On June 17 this year, the Ishiba Cabinet issued a written statement concerning the Nanjing Incident affirming that it’s not undeniable that after the Japanese troops entered the walled city of Nanjing, cases of slaughter and plunder against non-combatants may have occurred.

This statement is the follow-up of the government’s point of view posted on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. During the House of Councilors Audit Committee held on April 3 and 24, 2024, the then Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa, being asked about the documental grounds for the government’s view, answered, “It was made based on general perspective, not on the specific description of the particular source.” Thus, he failed to show the evidential papers.

In other words, the Ishiba Cabinet, despite the obvious lack of evidence, supported the conventional view by making a cabinet decision. This is an act of a grave betrayal of the people, which ignores the progress of academic study on this issue.

The Nanjing Incident was one of the felonies put on trial at the Tokyo Tribunal. The cabinet decision is the proof that Japan still lingers over the censorship policy established under the GHQ’s rule that the Tokyo Trials should not be criticized. The censorship should have been terminated after the end of occupation marked by the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952 and the restoration of Japan’s national independence. According to Eto, since what was practiced under the occupation was pre-censorship and the existence of such censorship was a strictly guarded secret, self-modification was made in a cooperative manner to continue the censorship policies. Self-destruction through this self-censorship was further practiced. It went on even after the system of censorship was terminated.

In addition, regarding the Nanjing Incident, when it comes to important sources which may lead to the truth, self-censorship exists through the process of translation into Japanese.

In my book Primary Historical Sources Reveal the Truth about the Nanjing Incident—Unravelling the Curse of American Missionaries’ View of History (published by Tendensha, 2020), I introduced for the first time evidential sources to refute the customary view of the Nanjing Incident translated into Japanese. (To be precise, part of them was introduced in advance in the magazine Seiron.) The major points are as follows:

(1) Remarks made by American missionaries who led the establishment of the Nanjing Safety Zone, indicating their intention to support the Chinese Army.

• Refusal on the part of the Japanese side regarding the establishment of the Safety Zone.
• Witness that refugees returned to their homes and that after the dissolution of the so-called safety zone, peace and order were restored in Nanjing.

My question is that regarding the primary sources of evidence for these matters (in English and in German), while surrounding parts are already translated and published, the core part which may lead to the truth of the Nanjing Incident, which is disadvantageous to the American and Tokyo Trials views of history, is omitted. Let me elaborate specifically on points (1) to (3).

As to (1), it refers to the remark made by the presumed leader among the missionaries, written in Missionary Vautrin’s diary to support the Chinese Army in the safety zone, which was supposed to be neutral. While Vautrin’s diary was translated into Japanese as Days of the Nanjing Incident (Ohtsuki Shoten, 1999), the part in question is not included, or the translator’s note does not refer to it. So, readers have no idea that American missionaries who remained in Nanjing and testified about the Nanjing Incident were not a neutral third party.

As to (2), in the book Collection of Sources of the Nanjing Incident (Aoki Shoten, 1992) aiming to unravel the Nanjing Incident through collecting contemporary sources about how the safety zone came to be established, many documents kept at Yale University were introduced but the sources regarding the fact that the Japanese Army clearly rejected the plan to establish the safety zone, also kept at the university, were omitted. As a result, the fact that the Nanjing Safety Zone was clearly unauthorized and fictitious, unlike the officially authorized Shanghai Safety Zone, was obviously obfuscated.

As to (3), it is a report made by the Chancellor of the German Embassy about the recovery of peace and order in Nanjing one month after the dissolution of the safety zone. This part was included in the original German edition of the book Der gute Deutsche von Nanking, edited from John Rabe’s diary by E. Wickert and in the translated English version The Good Man of Nanking by John E. Woods. However, in the Japanese translation The Truth of Nanking (Kodan-sha, 1997), this part was excluded for unknown reason. Consequently, if you read only the Japanese translation version, you cannot understand the mysterious fact that after the dissolution of the safety zone, which was supposed to protect the citizens, peace and order returned to Nanjing. Therefore, contrary to the conventional theory, it is not known that the existence of the fictitious safety zone was the very cause of the unrest and disorder.

The vital sources were not translated into Japanese. As a result, the simple conclusion I reached in my book based on American and European primary sources that “the support for the Chinese Army given by the American missionaries in the fictitious safety zone was the very reason why those missionaries created the Nanjing Incident”. But this information did not reach Japan. By hiding from the Japanese people the vital sources, which may have enabled them to criticize the Tokyo Trials and America, they prevented the truth from being found in Japan. Consequently, the Nanjing Incident has continued to be the center of anti-Japan propaganda for such a long time after the war. So was formerly The Rape of Nanking by Iris Chang and so is currently Japan’s Holocaust by Bryan Mark Rigg.

So far, I have tried to analyze the issue presented by Eto through his book Closed Narrative World, using the Nanjing Incident. Now, this issue is finally on its way to be resolved. This owes not much to the reflection on the part of the existing researchers, but to the progress made in information and communication technologies and as people become more aware of information disclosure, an escape hole appeared in the closed narrative world.

As to the afore-mentioned translation issue in the Nanjing Incident study, it has become much easier to gain access to original European and American sources through the Internet without depending on translated books. My book is exactly the gift of such advantage.

As for domestic dissemination of information, the conventional media, plagued with self-censorship, is no longer the central player. Instead, with the advent of social networks and freer new information channels, it has become possible to discuss in the public sphere what has been sealed as a taboo. This trend naturally influences the existing media. It also affects people bound by the existing media in their thinking and political activities. I hope this is the forerunner of a future trend, as has been just shown by the result of the recent national political elections.  

Japanese : https://i-rich.org/?p=2484

Shoichiro Kawahara
International Research Institute of Controversial Histories
Senior Researcher

1. Lai Ching-te’s value diplomacy

Here, “value diplomacy” refers to the diplomacy that regards democracy as the universal human truth and appreciates the value of democracy in dealing with the national diplomacy and security. Ever since he took the presidential office, President Lai Ching-te of Taiwan has thoroughly held the diplomatic policy of defending Taiwan as a democracy, in cooperation and alliance with other democracies in the world. President Lai Ching-te’s fundamental diplomatic principle can be termed “value diplomacy.”

Let us examine Lai Ching-te’s concept of “value diplomacy,” following his speeches and other sources.

First, in his inaugural address in May 2024, he stated, “As the vital nodal point of the global democratic alliance, the era of glorious Taiwanese democracy has dawned,” positioning Taiwan as the nodal point of a democratic alliance. He went on mentioning that Taiwan’s democracy will defend the country from China’s threat.

Then, in his speech on the National Day of the Republic of China in October last year, he said, “In the land of Taiwan, democracy and freedom of our choice have grown and been prospering while People’s Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan, which has thus rooted in this land.”

Additionally, in his National Day speech in October this year, he said, “Democracy and freedom obtained through democratization efforts is a shared national memory of the Taiwanese people and Taiwan is the lighthouse for democracy in Asia.”

Lai Ching-te recognizes democracy’s special value in diplomacy and national security and sets the foundation of the State of Taiwan on democracy. Lai Ching-te places Taiwan among democracies in the world by implementing and spreading democracy in the country and thoroughly carrying out “value diplomacy” to firmly establish Taiwan’s national security.

2, Value diplomacy of the first-term Trump administration and the Biden administration

The United States administrations up to the Biden administration, including Trump’s first term, had been conducting “value diplomacy” just like Taiwan’s. During the first-term Trump administration under Secretary of State Pompeo, the U.S. diplomacy was carried out from the standpoint of the United 　　　　　　States being the leader among the world democracies. Secretary Pompeo recognized the Chinese　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 Communist Pary as a “Marxist dictatorship” and advocated for defense of the free world, namely, the camp of global democracies. In his famous Nixon Library speech in July 2020, he said, “Look, we have to admit a hard truth. We must admit a hard truth that should guide us in the years and decades to come, that if we want to have a free 21st century, and not the Chinese century of which Xi Jinping dreams, the old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply won’t get it done.” While Secretary Pompeo tightened his ideological opposition against China, on the other hand, he praised Taiwan’s democracy and expressed his idea about the necessity to defend Taiwan as a functioning democracy. The Taiwan Travel Act, signed into law on March 16, 2018, by President Trump, allows high-level officials of the United States to visit Taiwan and vice versa, an exchange which had been previously restricted, attempting to strengthen close relationship between the two democracies. During the first-term Trump administration, “value diplomacy” was promoted by Secretary Pompeo.

In the Biden administration that followed, on such occasions as the East Asian Summit (EAS), they held up the ideas of “free and open Indo-Pacific” and “global order based on law,” designed to “defend freedom and democracy in Asia,” emphasized the alliance among democracies in the region, including Taiwan and cited democracy as a value that the United States should protect. In October 2021, President Biden, during the CNN Townhall, was asked by a reporter, “If China should attack Taiwan, will the United States defend Taiwan?” and he answered, “Yes, we are responsible for it.” During a press conference held in Tokyo in May 2022, being asked a similar question, he clearly answered, “Yes.” In the Biden administration, the idea of “value diplomacy” implemented during Secretary Pompeo’s term in office remained unwavering and democracy was placed at the center of the values to be kept, which means that the United States stood on the common diplomatic grounds which Lai Ching-te firmly defines as “value diplomacy.”

3. The second-term Trump administration’s deal diplomacy

Unlike the first-term Trump administration in which diplomacy was left to the Secretary of State, in the second-term Trump administration President Trump came to lead diplomatic actions himself and the nature of diplomacy has drastically changed.

In July 2024, in an interview with a weekly magazine (Bloomberg Businessweek), Mr. Trump said, “Taiwan should pay us the defense fee...We act exactly like an insurance company.” He meant that Taiwan’s defense is carried out because Taiwan pays an insurance fee in advance, considering the defense of Taiwan as a kind of a business deal.

Regarding the aspect of military support to Taiwan, it is pointed out that there is a symptom of changes, from the support of weapons to arms sales and to preference of large-scale arms sales over monetary aid.

President Trump, immediately after he took the presidential office, issued an executive order to freeze all foreign aid for ninety days for reassessment. The aid to Taiwan was no exception and was not treated as special value aid, Taiwanese aid was treated as conditional and open to reconsideration.

In addition, according to Reuters’ report of October 2025, President Trump is said to have mentioned that Taiwan should set its defense budget at 10% of the GDP. This also is an indication of the United States policy of asking Taiwan to spend more money as a preliminary condition for getting the U.S. support.

As seen so far, the second-term Trump administration’s diplomatic policy is far from “value diplomacy” and does not confer special value on democracy. Rather, the United States response and policy are to be decided by trade deals, which is “deal diplomacy.”

Lai Ching-te unwaveringly emphasizes that “Taiwan is among the global democracies,” and expects the United States to carry out its responsibility as the “leader of the democratic camp.” However, the second-term Trump administration is cautious to the idea that the United States should defend Taiwan as a universal duty of the democratic camp. When it comes to Taiwan’s defense, the U.S. tends to regard it as a target of a business deal, and apparently the dominant idea is that so long as it is not disadvantageous to the United States, the United States will act.

4. Responses from now on

During President Trump’s recent visit to several Asian countries at the end of October 2025, he did not show any sign of the United States being the leader of the world democracies and free trade world but ended up fully conducting trade deal diplomacy with respective countries. During the U.S.-China top meeting held in South Korea, the Taiwanese issue did not come up to the table. Back home in the United States, following media questions about Taiwan, the President mentioned that so long as he is in the office, invasion of Taiwan will never occur. The realistic U.S. response remains vague.

Considering the nature of the second-term Trump administration’s “deal diplomacy,” since military interference by the United States may not be expected when China invades Taiwan, it becomes necessary for Taiwan to build as soon as possible a defense system, which is “not solely dependent on the United States”. As part of those measures, such actions as increasing the defense budget, advancing the plan to buy weapons from the United States as early as possible and speedily strengthening the war potential are urgently needed.

Together with these, in Japan, it is necessary to strengthen the deterrent power on the part of the Japan’s Self Defense Forces as speedily as possible. And considering the importance of the alliance among other democracies, it is necessary to urgently examine the rearrangement of supply networks, and cooperative system regarding economic sanctions, technical control and other issues within the “democratic bloc.”