Author: Shoichiro Kawahara

Japanese : https://i-rich.org/?p=2484

Shoichiro Kawahara
International Research Institute of Controversial Histories
Senior Researcher

1. Lai Ching-te’s value diplomacy

Here, “value diplomacy” refers to the diplomacy that regards democracy as the universal human truth and appreciates the value of democracy in dealing with the national diplomacy and security. Ever since he took the presidential office, President Lai Ching-te of Taiwan has thoroughly held the diplomatic policy of defending Taiwan as a democracy, in cooperation and alliance with other democracies in the world. President Lai Ching-te’s fundamental diplomatic principle can be termed “value diplomacy.”

Let us examine Lai Ching-te’s concept of “value diplomacy,” following his speeches and other sources.

First, in his inaugural address in May 2024, he stated, “As the vital nodal point of the global democratic alliance, the era of glorious Taiwanese democracy has dawned,” positioning Taiwan as the nodal point of a democratic alliance. He went on mentioning that Taiwan’s democracy will defend the country from China’s threat.

Then, in his speech on the National Day of the Republic of China in October last year, he said, “In the land of Taiwan, democracy and freedom of our choice have grown and been prospering while People’s Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan, which has thus rooted in this land.”

Additionally, in his National Day speech in October this year, he said, “Democracy and freedom obtained through democratization efforts is a shared national memory of the Taiwanese people and Taiwan is the lighthouse for democracy in Asia.”

Lai Ching-te recognizes democracy’s special value in diplomacy and national security and sets the foundation of the State of Taiwan on democracy. Lai Ching-te places Taiwan among democracies in the world by implementing and spreading democracy in the country and thoroughly carrying out “value diplomacy” to firmly establish Taiwan’s national security.

2, Value diplomacy of the first-term Trump administration and the Biden administration

The United States administrations up to the Biden administration, including Trump’s first term, had been conducting “value diplomacy” just like Taiwan’s. During the first-term Trump administration under Secretary of State Pompeo, the U.S. diplomacy was carried out from the standpoint of the United 　　　　　　States being the leader among the world democracies. Secretary Pompeo recognized the Chinese　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 Communist Pary as a “Marxist dictatorship” and advocated for defense of the free world, namely, the camp of global democracies. In his famous Nixon Library speech in July 2020, he said, “Look, we have to admit a hard truth. We must admit a hard truth that should guide us in the years and decades to come, that if we want to have a free 21st century, and not the Chinese century of which Xi Jinping dreams, the old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply won’t get it done.” While Secretary Pompeo tightened his ideological opposition against China, on the other hand, he praised Taiwan’s democracy and expressed his idea about the necessity to defend Taiwan as a functioning democracy. The Taiwan Travel Act, signed into law on March 16, 2018, by President Trump, allows high-level officials of the United States to visit Taiwan and vice versa, an exchange which had been previously restricted, attempting to strengthen close relationship between the two democracies. During the first-term Trump administration, “value diplomacy” was promoted by Secretary Pompeo.

In the Biden administration that followed, on such occasions as the East Asian Summit (EAS), they held up the ideas of “free and open Indo-Pacific” and “global order based on law,” designed to “defend freedom and democracy in Asia,” emphasized the alliance among democracies in the region, including Taiwan and cited democracy as a value that the United States should protect. In October 2021, President Biden, during the CNN Townhall, was asked by a reporter, “If China should attack Taiwan, will the United States defend Taiwan?” and he answered, “Yes, we are responsible for it.” During a press conference held in Tokyo in May 2022, being asked a similar question, he clearly answered, “Yes.” In the Biden administration, the idea of “value diplomacy” implemented during Secretary Pompeo’s term in office remained unwavering and democracy was placed at the center of the values to be kept, which means that the United States stood on the common diplomatic grounds which Lai Ching-te firmly defines as “value diplomacy.”

3. The second-term Trump administration’s deal diplomacy

Unlike the first-term Trump administration in which diplomacy was left to the Secretary of State, in the second-term Trump administration President Trump came to lead diplomatic actions himself and the nature of diplomacy has drastically changed.

In July 2024, in an interview with a weekly magazine (Bloomberg Businessweek), Mr. Trump said, “Taiwan should pay us the defense fee...We act exactly like an insurance company.” He meant that Taiwan’s defense is carried out because Taiwan pays an insurance fee in advance, considering the defense of Taiwan as a kind of a business deal.

Regarding the aspect of military support to Taiwan, it is pointed out that there is a symptom of changes, from the support of weapons to arms sales and to preference of large-scale arms sales over monetary aid.

President Trump, immediately after he took the presidential office, issued an executive order to freeze all foreign aid for ninety days for reassessment. The aid to Taiwan was no exception and was not treated as special value aid, Taiwanese aid was treated as conditional and open to reconsideration.

In addition, according to Reuters’ report of October 2025, President Trump is said to have mentioned that Taiwan should set its defense budget at 10% of the GDP. This also is an indication of the United States policy of asking Taiwan to spend more money as a preliminary condition for getting the U.S. support.

As seen so far, the second-term Trump administration’s diplomatic policy is far from “value diplomacy” and does not confer special value on democracy. Rather, the United States response and policy are to be decided by trade deals, which is “deal diplomacy.”

Lai Ching-te unwaveringly emphasizes that “Taiwan is among the global democracies,” and expects the United States to carry out its responsibility as the “leader of the democratic camp.” However, the second-term Trump administration is cautious to the idea that the United States should defend Taiwan as a universal duty of the democratic camp. When it comes to Taiwan’s defense, the U.S. tends to regard it as a target of a business deal, and apparently the dominant idea is that so long as it is not disadvantageous to the United States, the United States will act.

4. Responses from now on

During President Trump’s recent visit to several Asian countries at the end of October 2025, he did not show any sign of the United States being the leader of the world democracies and free trade world but ended up fully conducting trade deal diplomacy with respective countries. During the U.S.-China top meeting held in South Korea, the Taiwanese issue did not come up to the table. Back home in the United States, following media questions about Taiwan, the President mentioned that so long as he is in the office, invasion of Taiwan will never occur. The realistic U.S. response remains vague.

Considering the nature of the second-term Trump administration’s “deal diplomacy,” since military interference by the United States may not be expected when China invades Taiwan, it becomes necessary for Taiwan to build as soon as possible a defense system, which is “not solely dependent on the United States”. As part of those measures, such actions as increasing the defense budget, advancing the plan to buy weapons from the United States as early as possible and speedily strengthening the war potential are urgently needed.

Together with these, in Japan, it is necessary to strengthen the deterrent power on the part of the Japan’s Self Defense Forces as speedily as possible. And considering the importance of the alliance among other democracies, it is necessary to urgently examine the rearrangement of supply networks, and cooperative system regarding economic sanctions, technical control and other issues within the “democratic bloc.”  

Japanese https://i-rich.org/?p=2256

Kawahara Shoichiro
Senior Researcher
International Research Institute of Controversial Histories (iRICH)

1.The Trump administration and China-Twaiwan relationship

In the United States, Mr. Trump took the presidential office, and the second Trump administration started. Viewing the members of the Trump administration in terms of the China-Taiwan relationship, Trump picked Mr. Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and Rep. Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor, as well as other senior officials, who are hard-liners on China. In Taiwan, most people expected Mr. Mike Pompeo to be reappointed Secretary of State, but it can be said that the Trump-picked lineup leaves nothing to be desired.

The China-Taiwan policy of the second Trump administration will basically follow the first -term hard line that confronted China with additional tariffs. Mr. Trump invited former Prime Minister Abe’s widow to his home and talked with her, prior to meeting with Prime Minister Ishiba, which has profound significance. One thing can be said that Mr. Trump will respect Mr. Abe’s policy-line on the diplomatic issues including how to deal with China from now on. Abe’s extremely pro-Taiwan policy was detested by the Chinese Communist Party and there was violent protest against it, which is fresh to our memory.

The great characteristic of Mr. Trump’s diplomatic policy is that he often shows little trust toward international organizations and acts unilaterally as a leader of the United States to solve the problem. Certainly, his way of dealing carries significant destructive power and is often very effective. In his first-term administration, he did not participate in the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement) promoted by Mr. Obama, his predecessor, and instead, applied the method of unilaterally sanctioning China according to the US Trade Law. China could do nothing whatsoever to cope with  these measures. Considering these circumstances, some predict that Trump may withdraw from the IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework) promoted by the Biden administration, of which the United States is a Party.

On the other hand, the China-Taiwan relationships have become increasingly tense. The Chinese Communist Party regards Mr. Lai Ching-te as Taiwan’s independence advocate and has been strengthening the military drill for the siege of Taiwan. In October 2024, in his presidential address marking the Double Tenth holiday (Taiwan’s National Day), President Lai referred to Taiwan as an independent state, which China regarded as totally unacceptable and conducted the largest ever military drill for the siege of Taiwan. CIA Director Burns said in February 2023 that President Xi Jinping ordered the Chinese Army to complete the preparation for invasion of Taiwan by 2027. If this is true, around 2027, China will most likely invade Taiwan.

2.The Chinese Communist Party’s scenario for the unification with Taiwan

The current key factor of the China-Taiwan relationships is the unification with Taiwan planned by the Chinese Communist Party, which has two scenarios, peaceful and military ones. These two scenarios are not to be carried out alone, but reciprocally and accordingly to the respective situation at the time.

The peaceful scenario is basically stated in the “Five-Article Common Recognition (Five Great Hopes)” agreed upon during the top meeting between Lien Chan, Chairman of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and Hu Jin Tao, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2005. According to the “Five Great Hopes,” Taiwan is to be economically incorporated and become highly dependent on China and then conclude the peace agreement to complete the unification of Taiwan with China, which is exactly the Chinese Communist Party’s scenario to unify Taiwan. Mr. Ma Ying-jeou, who restored the Kuomintang government in 2008, faithfully carried out the Five Great Hopes. And in 2011, adding the finishing touch to the Five Great Hopes, Mr. Ma proposed the peace agreement across the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwanese most strongly opposed the proposition, and Mr. Ma was obliged to withdraw his proposal immediately.

Later, in 2016, Ms. Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party became the president, and the peace agreement across the Taiwan Strait was strictly sealed by the revised law that prohibits the peace agreement from being discussed as an agenda. In the following 2024, Mr. Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party won the presidential election and succeeded the political position held by the Tsai Ing-wen administration.

Under such circumstances, the military unification scenario came to attract the people’s attention. The Chinese Communist Party, in view of the planned military attack on Taiwan, has been rapidly increasing military strength. Communist China’s military drills expand in scale, every time one takes place, it covers Taiwan wider and wider, threatens the Taiwanese people and incites fear.

3.Mr. Trump and the strategical ambiguity  

In an interview with the Wall Street Journal (digital edition) in October 2024, being asked how he would respond if China should blockade Taiwan, Mr. Trump said that if China should enter Taiwan, he would impose 150% to 200% tariffs on China. Instead of immediately resorting to military force, he would counter by additional tariffs, which would totally destroy the Chinese economy. This would be an effective deterrent. When asked directly if he would employ military force to cope with the siege of Taiwan, he said that there would be no need to use military force, because Mr. Xi respects him and knows that he is extraordinary. This probably means that if the United States should use armed force, that would be far more powerful than an ordinary deployment. Mr. Trump contrasts with Mr. Biden, who immediately answered that he would when asked if he would use military force in carrying out use of force. Mr. Trump thinks it better to leave certain strategical ambiguity at the time of Taiwan emergency.

4.The recognition of Taiwan’s statehood and national security

Like in the first one, in the second Trump administration, the policy of prioritizing Taiwan will be maintained, and arms sales and other measures will be actively conducted. There is one important issue the second Trump administration may possibly face. That is the issue of the recognition of Taiwan’s statehood as former Secretary State Pompeo advocates.

On May 7, 2022, while visiting Taiwan, Mr. Pompeo said that the United States should immediately carry out what it should have carried out much sooner. That is to recognize Taiwan as a free sovereign state. He also said that the recognition of Taiwan’s statehood is the largest security for Taiwan.

Mr. Pompeo has been energetically acting to achieve that goal, lobbying the United States authorities for the recognition of Taiwan’s statehood. During a meeting at the Hudson Institute, Mr. Pompeo said he encourages US officials to visit Taiwan more often, even though doing so would incite threats from the CCP. “I hope more other senior American officials will join me in this, because I think it will create noise,” he said. “There will be angst, the Chinese Communist Party will bluster and threaten, but that clarity will provide the call for the world to accept the fundamental truth, that fundamental reality.”

That “reality” is that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country, he said.

The Chinese Communist Party does not accept Taiwan’s statehood. According to the CCP, the use of armed force against Taiwan is a domestic issue within the state called China. In other words, any use of armed force against Taiwan is a pure domestic matter and other countries should not interfere in a country’s domestic policy.

Looking at the reality of the Taiwan Strait, anyone cannot help but feel that the Chinese Communist Party’s assertion that Taiwan is part of China is a sheer sophistry. According to international law and the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, the criteria for statehood are (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) government and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Taiwan satisfies all these qualifications without any problem. Anyone knows Taiwan’s steady and continuous activities over the last thirty years as an independent democracy. It is undeniable that two states exist across the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Pary’s use of force against Taiwan clearly violates the United Nations Charter Article 2-4: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

However, at present, Taiwan is not permitted to join the United Nations and is disqualified as a member of any United Nations organizations. The rights of the population of 23 million Taiwanese are damaged in many ways.

In reality, any state that intends to recognize Taiwan as a state should be fully prepared for severance of its diplomatic relationship with China as the Chinese Communist Party’s retaliatory measure. Therefore, no state is willing to recognize Taiwan’s statehood for fear of such diplomatic risk. The only state that can risk such a diplomatic disadvantage is the United States. However, the current difficult global circumstances would not allow the United States to take such a risk. It would be either when the China-Taiwan relationships are stressed to the extreme or the use of force becomes reality that the United States will step forward to recognize Taiwan’s statehood. In that case, the United States would be requested to recognize Taiwan’s statehood in view of securing the rightfulness of the use of force under the international law and obtaining due agreement from other countries of the world.

Aside from the prospect of whether the critical situation between China and Taiwan occurs during the second-term Trump administration, the recognition of Taiwan’s statehood is a crucial issue directly affecting the entire world. The United States will further deliberate the Taiwan issue from now on. It is not at all desirable to leave China’s sophistry as it is, which clearly contradicts the reality of the Taiwan Strait and violates the Taiwanese rights. While expecting Mr. Pompeo and his supporters to make further efforts, in Japan, we should promote the awareness of this issue so that the recognition of Taiwan’s statehood may be realized as soon as possible.

Shoichiro Kawahara
Senior researcher
International Research Institute for Controversial Histories

Japanese https://i-rich.org/?p=1803

1. The result of the 2024 Taiwanese Presidential election

In the 2024 Taiwanese Presidential election, candidate Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won with a turnout rate of about 40%. The election was fought among three candidates, Lai, Hou Yu-ih of the leading opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) and Ko Wen-je of the second opposition Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). Although candidate Lai reportedly held a marginal lead, it was a very close race to the end. At the result of this election, European and American countries belonging to the democratic bloc felt relieved. However, in the legislative election held simultaneously, the DPP could not win the majority seats, which will be a reason for concern about the Taiwanese government from now on.

The biggest issue in the election was how to deal with Communist China. In this regard, candidate Lai Ching-te continued the political line held by the current Tsai Ing-wen administration, keeping a certain distance from Communist China and never succumbing to China’s pressure.

Against this, the Nationalist Party candidate Hou Yu-ih basically holds the reconciliatory line with the Chinese Communist Party and emphasizes promotion of economic relationships through talks between China and Taiwan.

And candidate Ko Wen-je stood in-between the two candidates and claimed to act as a bridge between Chian and Taiwan.

As the election campaigns moved on among the three candidates, Communist China did everything to establish a China-friendly government in Taiwan, meddling in the election so that pro-China Hou Yu-ih might get majority votes. China’s actions included military pressure, trade restriction, media interference, dissemination of fake news, inviting influential Taiwanese to China, offering economic incentives to Taiwanese businesses, inviting Taiwanese youths to study in China and many others.

Why, then, is Communist China so entirely intent on establishing a pro-China government in Taiwan? That is because these attempts directly lead to China’s scenario of unified Taiwan. Now, let us look at it closely.

2. Communist China’s scenario of peaceful unification of Taiwan

There are two scenarios of the unification of Taiwan by Communist China, peaceful and military. Popularly discussed is the military scenario, but it is the last resort, so to speak, and the peaceful unification should be the first consideration.

In Communist China’s plan of peaceful unification of Taiwan, it was early in the 2000s that Communist China came up with the idea of using the opponent Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) when the Kuomintang left the government for the first time. At that time, the Nationalist Party was totally shocked and despondent after losing the ruling power and Communist China used this opportunity to lend a helping hand to the Party in distress. This attempt culminated in the summit meeting between Lien Chan, the Chairman of the Kuomintang and the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Jintao on April 29, 2005. The meeting was called the third collaboration of the Nationalist and Communist parties. At the meeting five common recognitions (hereinafter, “Five Great Wishes”) were announced. The Five Great Wishes exactly manifest the scenario of the peaceful unification of Communist China and Taiwan. They are 1) to resume talks between both sides of the strait, 2) to have regular exchanges between the two Parties, 3) to discuss the way how Taiwan should engage in international activities, 4) to establish an overall economic and trade cooperation across the strait, and 5) to conclude the peace pact across the strait.

Kuomintang Ma Ying-jeou, who returned to power in 2005, faithfully carried out the Five Great Wishes. However, regarding the economic and trade cooperation, although the economic operation framework agreement was concluded in 2010 and a wide range of free activities was realized, the approval of the service-trade pact failed due to an opposition movement initiated by students (Sunflower Students’ Movement), so, the pact remained ineffective. In 2011, a plan of cross-strait peace treaty was brought up, but it was too premature; it was met with strong opposition within Taiwan and had to be promptly withdrawn. Later, in the Tsai Ing-wen administration, both the service-trade pact and the cross-strait peace treaty were shelved and remain unattended to this day.

Communist China aims to establish a pro-China Government by putting service-trade pact into effect and promoting control over the media, publishing, finance, and insurance in Taiwan. Candidates Ko Wen-je and Hou Yu-ih asserted their willingness to put this service-trade pact into effect early in their election campaigns, which shows that both candidates were working for Communist China.

Then, after imposing control over free speech in Taiwan, China aims to imbue the Taiwanese mind with the idea of “one country, two systems.” In view of Communist China, Taiwanese people’s repulsion for “one-country, two systems” is a major factor of preventing the unification of Taiwan and so, China tries to remove the factor. By reducing the Taiwanese people’s repulsion as much as possible, they will conclude the cross-strait peace agreement in a peaceful manner.

As a matter of fact, in order to reach the conclusion of the cross-strait peace pact, many unpredictable and complicated situations may occur, but the main scenario would be as mentioned above. In either case, without a pro-China government, it would be impossible to realize such scenario. The election this time turned out to be unsuccessful in realizing the scenario and Communist China’s plot has failed.

3. Armed unification and Taiwan’s statehood

The remaining scenario for Communist China to follow is military unification or armed integration. In this respect, how to deal with Taiwan’s statehood becomes a very important issue, and it will decide the success or failure of the entire scenario. It is an issue whether foreign countries interfering in the use of force against Taiwan is permissible or not in terms of international law.

Communist China does not recognize Taiwan as a State and states that Communist China’s use of force against Taiwan is a domestic matter within a State. The Government of Taiwan is merely a revolting group within the country and using armed force against the group is a domestic matter which other countries should not interfere in.

Against this assertion, the Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party maintains that Taiwan is fully eligible for statehood and circumstantially a divided state. The two cross-strait realities are that the Republic of China in Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China in mainland respectively and parallelly exist as divided states and that Communist China should recognize the reality. Accordingly, Communist China’s use of armed force against Taiwan is equivalent to “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,” as stipulated to refrain from in Article 2-4 of the Charter of the United Nations. And it cannot be helped if such act should be interfered in by other countries.

However, another Taiwanese political party, the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) holds a different view. The Kuomintang has been holding the traditional party policy of “China is one” ever since Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership. The party ceased to emphasize the view but has not abandoned the view that Taiwan is part of the Chinese State, including the mainland.

As for the People’s Party, they have remained silent regarding the view of statehood and have not clarified their position.

We should be aware that views of statehood vary withing Taiwan. And yet, through democratic practices over the past thirty years, the great majority of Taiwanese realize that they live their daily life in a practically independent country and only a very few Taiwanese think that Taiwan is a part of the Chinese State.

It should be confirmed under the international law that Taiwan is a genuine independent state. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States sets out the four criteria for statehood that the state as a person of international law should possess: (a) a permanent population; (b)a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Taiwan unquestionably satisfies all these qualifications. In addition, no country in the world fails to recognize the continuous activities carried out by Taiwan as an independent state for the past thirty years. It is an indisputable fact that Taiwan is factually an independent state while Communist China is busy employing sophistry. To treat Taiwan as a true state enhances the international status of Taiwan and contributes to its security.

4. The Taiwanese Strait and the East Asia in future

In, the recent presidential election, Lai Ching-te won, pledged to succeed the Tsai Ing-wen political line, which has lessened the fear lest the Taiwanese Strait situation should rapidly become unstable. Still, the military pressure against Taiwan by China will be further strengthened and cross-strait tension will further intensify.

On the other hand, as confrontation between the United States and China in the East Asia, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea, further accelerates, in terms of defense strategy, the value of Taiwan, a democratic state in the East Asia, is getting higher than ever. Therefore, it is unthinkable for the United States not to interfere in the use of force by China against Taiwan. Taiwan is the pivot of the current East Asian policy of the United States leading the democratic bloc. In this sense, to abandon Taiwan means collapse and defeat of the U.S. Asian policy.

Under such circumstances, it was good news for the democratic bloc that the favorable result of the recent Taiwanese Presidential election prevented Communist China’s scenario of peaceful unification of Taiwan and China. However, I must repeat once again that in the legislative election, the Party could not secure the majority seats. This will bring many difficulties in running the Government. The outlook for the Lai Ching-te Government is far from optimistic. 

- China Does Not Have a Legal Right of Possession of Taiwan -

Japanese : https://i-rich.org/?p=886

　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Kawahara Shoichiro

Senior researcher

International Research Institute for Controversial Histories (iRICH)

October , 2022

1　“Legal status of Taiwan undetermined” argument

　The question of whether China will invade Taiwan and, if so, when, has recently be raised with a sense of urgency by the mass media. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the question of Taiwan has come under more intense scrutiny, with comparison between Taiwan and Ukraine.

　A forced Chinese absorption of Taiwan, the so-called Taiwan issue, is the most significant issue in East Asia, as it has the potential to have a great impact, in terms of degree and extent, and will inevitably involve Japan as well as the US.

　Did you know that one argument underlying the Taiwan issue is that the legal status of Taiwan has yet to be determined, or “undetermined”, which seems to attracting attention?

　The view that the “legal status of Taiwan is undetermined,” simply put, is that Japan renounced its possession of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands after WWII but only renounced its right of possession and did not specify territorial jurisdiction. Even now, determination of who holds the right of possession of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands is pending, which necessitates certain procedures, such as holding an international conference to determine who bears the right of possession. That is, the Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco Peace Treaty), which was concluded on September 8, 1951, merely stated that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores” in Article 2 Section b and other provisions are not mentioned.

　Both China and the Kuomintang (KMT), or the Chinese Nationalist Party of Taiwan, have rejected the “legal status of Taiwan is undetermined” view. At one time, during the KMT Ma Ying-jeou administration, the Chief Representative of the Interchange Association Taipei Office in Japan mentioned this “legal status of Taiwan undetermined” view and the relationship between Japan and Taiwan temporarily deteriorated.

However, the Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan has not stated its attitude toward the “legal status of Taiwan is undetermined” view and, conversely, is presumed to embrace it from the perspective of Taiwanese independence. The US held the view that the “legal status of Taiwan is undetermined” up until US-China rapprochement. However, Henry Kissinger, then Special Assistant to President Nixon, promised verbally to then Premier Zhou Enlai that the US would subsequently cease to assert that the “legal status of Taiwan is undetermined”. The US has not raised this view ever since.

In Japan, those engaged in Taiwan-related affairs and research are aware of the “legal status of Taiwan is undetermined” view and nothing more. This is also true worldwide—awareness with no further discussion. Therefore, the meaning of Article 2 Section b of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in the context of a special international situation remains unexamined. Accordingly, the current paper intends to revisit this matter and make clear that China has no legal right of possession of Taiwan based on Article 2 Section b of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. I will point out that, after all, this issue boils down to a question of Taiwanese nationhood.

　

2　The Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Declaration

　In terms of the right of possession of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, it is necessary to see how Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands were treated in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration before looking at the provision in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. 　

The first instance when the Allies took up the issue of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, which were in Japan’s possession, was in the Cairo Declaration, issued on December 1, 1943. The signatories of the Cairo Declaration were the heads of the US, the UK and the Republic of China. The Declaration stated:

“It is their [the Allies’] purpose … that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.”

　This provision in the Cairo Declaration was assumed by the Potsdam Declaration, which was issued jointly by the US, the UK and Republic of China (and later joined by the USSR) on July 26, 1945. In the Potsdam Declaration, Article 8 stated:

“The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”

　As is well known, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration. Acceptance obliged Japan to carry out the provisions of the individual Articles in the Potsdam Declaration including the fulfillment of the Cairo Declaration. However, this does not immediately evoke legal transfer of the right of possession of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands.

　Pro-China parties and scholars argue that the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration evoked transfer of the right of possession of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands and so there is no basis for a “legal status is undetermined” view—which is obviously not valid. Transfer of a right, based on international law, does not come into effect unless a treaty is signed by government representatives and ratified by its council. Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration merely obligated Japan to carry out the obligations in it and does not evoke a legal transfer of the right of possession. The obligations in the Potsdam Declaration were in fact fulfilled, in all forms, by Article 2 Section b of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. If acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration induced transfer of the right of possession, the relevant provision in the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have been pointless and the provision should not have been made. The provision is there in the Treaty because Japan still had the right of possession at the time of the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

3　Occupatio

　Now, let’s go back to the discussion about the provision of Article 2 Section b of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. This Section provided that Japan renounces the right of possession of Taiwan and the Pescadores and the land of which the right of possession was renounced becomes terra nullius. The principle of law based on international law concerning terra nullius is occupatio, which means that a nation can acquire ownership of terra nullius as its territory by exercising control over it before other nations do. What “exercising control” means is arguable but let us say that it refers to the state in which sovereignty is peacefully and continuously exercised over terra nullius without objection from other nations.

　Article 2 Section c of the San Francisco Peace Treaty prescribes renouncement of sovereignty over the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin and Article 2 Section f prescribes renouncement of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. However, there is no provision concerning their territorial jurisdiction. Of these lands, at present, the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin are possessed by Russia and possession of the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands are contested by six nations, a result of application of occupatio. That is, these lands were rendered terra nullius on April 28, 1952, the day that the Treaty of Peace with Japan took effect, but the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin was under control by the USSR at that point, and ever since, and no nation has raised an objection to the USSR possessing the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin. As for the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, since these lands became terra nullius, no nation has exercised control over these lands without objection from other nations, leading to on-going dispute.

　What about Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands? These lands were occupied by the Republic of China (the Government of Taiwan) when they became terra nullius. However, the People’s Republic of China (the Government of China) claims to possesses the lands. The current situation can hardly be said to be peaceful “exercising of control" and there is doubt of whether the Government of Taiwan possesses Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands.

　At the same time, the Government of China does not even occupy Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands; the Government of China is not “exercising control” over Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands. Based on occupatio, the Government of China has no legal right of possession of Taiwan.

4　Conclusion

　One could comment on my conclusion: This conclusion springs form the view that the Government of Taiwan and the Government of China are treated as separate nations. If there is one, unified China, of both mainland China and Taiwan, and the Government of China and the Government of Taiwan represent local governments of a unified China, then all lands can be regarded as territories of the unified China, which includes land possessed by the Government of Taiwan. That is, the right of possession of Taiwan belongs to a unified China.

At the moment, however, the Government of Taiwan does not accept this view and the international community does not accept this view either. In the US’s One China policy, the US acknowledges that the Government of China maintains there is “one China”, which includes Taiwan, and there is no further debate. Japan has practically taken the same position as the US.

　In the end, it should be clear that the issue boils down to a question of Taiwanese nationhood. If the Government of Taiwan is recognized as a nation, then the Government of Taiwan can claim the right of possession of Taiwan based on occupatio and furthermore, the Government of China has absolutely no right of possession.  However, if Taiwan is not recognized as an individual nation, then there can only be “one China”.

　In the future, with increasingly strained relations between China and Taiwan, the question of Taiwanese nationhood will add even more tension. I hope that the current paper, which raises anew the “legal status of Taiwan is undetermined” view, will be a starting point for discussion concerning future diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.